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Abstract 
Background and Objectives:  This experiment examined whether reflecting on a core value—
value-affirmation—was effective in attenuating state paranoia in students.  
Methods: University students (N=55) were randomised to either a value-affirmation or non-
affirmation control condition before exposure to a paranoia-induction manipulation (high 
self-awareness plus failure feedback). Paranoid cognitions were measured before (T1) and 
after (T2) the value-affirmation task and after the paranoia-induction task (T3). Depressive 
cognitions were also measured at T3.  
Results: Affirming a valued domain had a direct and significant effect on reducing state 
paranoia prior to the paranoia-induction task (T2), such that the overall impact of the 
paranoia-induction on state paranoia was not significantly different from baseline. This effect 
was not attributable to differential changes in depression across groups.  
Limitations:  Use of a nonclinical sample limits generalisation to clinical groups.  Repeat 
testing of key variables is a limitation, although this was necessary to assess change over 
time, and use of randomisation increased the internal validity of the study.  
Conclusions:  These findings suggest that self-affirmation is effective in reducing state 
paranoia in a nonclinical sample.   
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Paranoid thinking is characterised by the belief that another person is, or is planning, 
to cause one harm—be that physical, social or psychological (Freeman & Garety, 2000). 
Whilst paranoia can be a central feature of severe mental ill-health, substantial evidence 
suggests that paranoid thinking commonly occurs, in an attenuated form, in the general 
population (e.g. Ellett, Lopes, & Chadwick, 2003; Freeman, 2007); a view that is consistent 
with modern dimensional models of mental ill-health (Caspi et al., 2013).  It is estimated that 
at least 10-15% of the general public experience suspiciousness, assumptions of another’s 
hostile intentions, and even notions of conspirational intent (Freeman, 2007).  
The experimental investigation of paranoid thinking is beginning to validate key 
theoretical assumptions about phenomenology and underlying mechanisms of paranoia (e.g. 
Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998; Ellett et al., 2013; Ellett & Chadwick, 2007; Freeman et al., 
2008). For example, several studies have now shown that state paranoia can be triggered in 
virtual environments even though the avatars are programmed to behave in neutral ways (e.g. 
Freeman et al., 2008). This demonstrates that paranoid perception goes beyond the 
environmental stimuli, and involves top-down alongside bottom-up processing.  Likewise, 
recent research using the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Ellett et al., 2013) has suggested that 
paranoia is indeed necessarily interpersonal (i.e. one is always paranoid about someone) and 
associated with fear-based, rather than greed-based, processes.    
A third experimental paradigm has identified a key role for self-awareness and task 
failure in the emergence of paranoid thinking in students. Fenigstein & Vanable (1992) found 
that increasing self-awareness (e.g., through a mirror) had the effect of increasing paranoid 
cognitions, perhaps by increasing the self-as-target bias—a tendency to see the self as the 
target of others’ thoughts and actions. Based on these findings, Bodner and Mikulincer 
(1998) developed a unique paradigm that brought level of self-awareness under experimental 
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control. In this design, participants completed an impossible computer task (failure feedback) 
under conditions of high or low self-awareness, determined by the presence (high self-
awareness) or absence (low self-awareness) of a video camera plus monitor. Research has 
demonstrated that these environmental conditions reliably trigger state paranoia in students 
(Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998; Ellett & Chadwick, 2007), perhaps by setting up an actual-ideal 
self discrepancy (i.e., heightened awareness of not living up to one’s ideal standards), which 
the paranoid attribution functions to resolve (see Bentall, 2003 on actual-ideal self-
discrepancy and paranoia). This account is consistent with the defensive effects of self-
evaluation (Sedikides & Strube, 1997) and research that documents increased self-
enhancement bias under conditions of high self-awareness (Cohen et al., 1985; Campbell & 
Sedikides, 1999).  
Steele’s (1988) well-validated theory of self-affirmation posits that affirming the self 
in a domain unrelated to the source of self-threat, attenuates the need for defensive 
processing, by boosting psychological resources. Consistent with this, a plethora of research 
has reliably demonstrated that affirming a highly valued domain, unrelated to the source of 
threat, significantly attenuates defensive processing, as measured by a host of dependent 
variables (e.g., attitude change, biased information processing, self-serving causal 
attributions: see Sherman & Cohen, 2006 and McQueen & Klein, 2006). In their study, Ellett 
and Chadwick (2007, study 3) found that boosting psychological resources by priming 
participants with positive self-cognitions before exposure to failure plus camera conditions 
resulted in significantly lower state paranoia than those primed with negative self-cognitions. 
However, the absence of baseline measures and of a control group limits the conclusions that 
can be drawn. 
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This study was designed to test the effect of self-affirmation on state paranoia. 
Participants were randomised to either a self-affirmation or a control task prior to exposure to 
the paranoia induction (failure plus camera).  Participants reported on state paranoia at 
baseline (T1), post affirmation task (T2), and following the paranoia induction (T3).  Based 
on the theory of self-affirmation (Steele, 1988), and consistent with the findings of Ellett and 
Chadwick (2007, study 3), we predicted that state paranoia would be significantly lower in 
affirmed participants relative to non-affirmed controls at T3. Given that depressed mood co-
occurs with paranoia, and may legitimately be induced by high self-awareness and failure 
feedback, this was controlled for in the analyses.  
Method 
Design. A repeated measures experimental design was employed. The independent 
variable was affirmation condition (self-affirmation versus control) and the dependent 
variable was state paranoia following the failure plus camera condition. Covariates included 
baseline state paranoia and a state measure of depressed mood (measured at T3 only). A trait 
measure of depression was also taken at baseline to ensure group equivalence.  
Participants. An opportunity sample of students (N = 55) from a British university (74% 
female, 66% White British, mean age 21.36 years) took part. The sample size was determined 
by a priori power calculations: estimating an effect size of 0.7 (McQueen & Klein, 2006), 
with alpha at 0.05 and power at 0.80.   
Measures.  
Paranoia and Depression Scale (PDS; Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998) is a 17-item state 
measure of depressive (10-items) and paranoid (7-items) thoughts and feelings. Items are 
rated on a 6-point scale (1 - not at all to 6 - very often) and were derived from measures of 
depressive and paranoid psychopathology. Only the paranoia items (e.g., “I feel that people 
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are hostile to me”, “I feel that others are picking on me”) were measured at baseline (most 
depression items relate directly to task performance). Both depression (e.g., “I feel ashamed 
of my task performance”, “I don’t have the appropriate abilities to perform the task”) and 
paranoia items were administered following the task. These items have shown good 
discriminant and convergent validity and internal consistency (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998). 
For example, Bodner & Mikulincer (1998) report that paranoia items were significantly 
related to the paranoia subscale of the SCL-90 (r = .67, p < .001) and depression items were 
significantly related to the BDI (r = .68, p < .001). In the current sample, the internal 
consistency was α = .83 for depression and α = .78 for paranoia. In support of the convergent 
and discriminant validity of the PDS, in the current study, the paranoia items correlated 
significantly with a well-validated measure of trait paranoia (Paranoia Scale, Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992; r = .53, p <.001) and did not significantly correlate with a measure of social 
anxiety (Self-Consciousness Scale – Social Anxiety subscale; Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 
1975; r = .06, p = .68). The PDS depression items correlated significantly with a well-
validated measure of depression (Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale – Depression items, 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; r = .44, p < .001) and were not significantly correlated to 
anxiety (Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale – Anxiety items, Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; 
r = .08, p = .53). 
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is a 42-item 
measure designed to assess the core symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress over the last 
week. Depression items were used in this study to assess group equivalence at baseline. Items 
are rated using a 4-point Likert scale of frequency or severity. Good discriminant and 
concurrent validity (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, Swinson, 1998) and internal consistency 
values have been reported in normative samples (e.g., Depression α = 0.91, Anxiety α = 0.84 
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and Stress α = 0.90, Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). In the current sample, the internal 
consistency of the depression subscale was good (α = 0.91). 
Procedure. Ethical approval was gained prior to the commencement of the study, and 
all participants gave written informed consent. Participants were randomised to condition by 
a third party independent of the study, using an online randomisation tool 
(www.randomisation.org).  Participants first completed baseline demographic questionnaires, 
paranoia items of the PDS, and the DASS. Participants were then blindly randomised to the 
self-affirmation or affirmation control. In both conditions, participants rank ordered the 
importance of 11 valued domains (see Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000): Artistic skills/ 
Aesthetic appreciation; Sense of Humour; Relations with friends/family; Spontaneity/ Living 
life in the moment; Social Skills; Athletics, Musical ability/ appreciation; Physical 
Attractiveness; Creativity; Business/Money and Romantic values. Self-affirmation 
participants then wrote, for 10 minutes, about their top value (i.e., why it was meaningful to 
them and describing a time that it made them feel good about themselves). Conversely, 
control participants wrote about their least valued domain from the perspective of an average 
university student. As a post-task manipulation check, participants rated four statements 
(‘This value or personal characteristic has influenced my life’; ‘In general, I try to live up to 
this value’; ‘This value is an important part of who I am’; ‘I care about this value’) using the 
scale 1 ‘strongly disagree’ – 6 ‘strongly agree’ (see  Sherman et al., 2000).  
Participants then re-completed paranoia items of the PDS, after which they moved to 
a separate section of the experimental room to complete the paranoia induction task, which 
involved completing an unsolvable task under conditions of high self-awareness, manipulated 
using a video camera and linked monitor (see Ellett and Chadwick (2007), for further details). 
Following Duval and Silvia (2002), participants were told that the camera was used to ensure 
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experimental consistency.  After the paranoia induction, participants completed a final 
version of the PDS (paranoia plus depression items: T3).  
Statistical approach. To test the effect of self-affirmation on state paranoia, a 3 
(Time: state paranoia T1, T2 and T3) x 2 (Condition: self-affirmation versus non-affirmed 
control) repeated measures ANCOVA was computed, controlling for state depression at T3. 
Significant findings were decomposed using between-group t-tests and a repeated measures 
ANOVA with contrasts.   
Results  
Independent t-tests and chi-square analyses were computed to assess group equivalence 
at baseline and to confirm the success of the self-affirmation manipulation (see Table 1).      
Table 1 also shows the means and standard deviations for state paranoia and depression, 
split by condition, across time. A repeated measures 3 (Time: state paranoia T1, T2 and T3) x 
2 (Condition: self-affirmation versus non-affirmed control) ANCOVA (co-varying for state 
depression scores at T3) showed a significant Time x Condition interaction (F(2, 53) = 3.15, p = 
.05), suggesting the two groups differed in their paranoia scores across the three time points.  
Between-group t-tests (Table 1) indicated that state paranoia was significantly lower in 
affirmed participants both after the act of self-affirmation (comparing groups at T2)  and after 
exposure to the paranoia induction (comparing groups at T3). In support of the selective 
effect of affirmation condition on paranoia, independent t-tests also showed that there was no 
significant between-group difference on depression scores following the task. These findings 
suggest that paranoia was significantly lower amongst participants in the self-affirmation 
condition compared with the control and that this was not attributable to differential changes 
in mood.     
 
9 
Running Head:  Self-affirmation and paranoia 
 
INSERT TABLE 1  
 
 Repeated measures ANOVA contrasts were also conducted in the affirmation and 
control conditions separately, to ascertain the pattern of change in paranoia across the study.  
In the affirmation condition, there was a significant reduction in state paranoia following the 
affirmation manipulation (F(1,27) = 5.26, p = .03), suggesting that affirming a valued domain 
reduced state paranoia.  Paranoia then significantly increased following exposure to the 
paranoia induction (F(1,27) = 6.45, p = .01).  In the control condition, there was no change in 
paranoia following the control task (F(1,26) = 0.63, p = .44), but as expected, paranoia 
significantly increased following exposure to the paranoia induction (F(1,26) = 15.03, p = 
.001). 
Discussion. 
This study used a well-validated experimental paradigm, which combines high self-
awareness and failure, to examine the possible protective function of self-affirmation on state 
paranoia in college students. Our data also show empirically for the first time that self-
affirmation resulted in a reduction in state paranoia in a student population and that this 
impact was not attributable to confounding changes in depression. In fact, the effect of self-
affirmation was specific to paranoid thinking and appeared to have no differential effect on 
low mood. These findings are consistent with a robust literature on the effects of self-
affirmation on defensive processes in social psychology (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; McQueen 
& Klein, 2006) and complements existing data that suggests the impact of self-affirmation on 
defensive processing is not attributable to changes in mood (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000, study 3; 
Sherman et al., 2000, study 1, 2005, study 1).  
Our findings also raise an interesting question about the mechanism by which 
affirmation influences paranoia—does affirmation act as a buffer (attenuating a rise in 
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paranoia pre-post camera plus failure) or as an intervention (directly reducing paranoia prior 
to a threatening encounter)?  Social psychology research has found evidence for both 
(McQueen & Klein, 2006), and the data reported here are consistent with affirmation acting 
as an intervention—that is, reducing baseline levels of state paranoia, rather than preventing a 
subsequent increase in paranoia when exposed to camera plus failure. These findings suggest 
that affirming a valued domain may incur benefits by rendering the individual more 
psychologically robust when they enter into an environment that poses a threat to self. Future 
research might usefully examine the processes through which affirmations achieve their 
effects, which remain largely unknown and frequently debated (Stapel & van der Linden, 
2011). Recent research has suggested that affirmations may boost psychological resources 
through enhancing a sense of social belonging—a feeling of closeness and connectedness 
with others (see Shnabel, Purdie-Vaughns, Cook, Garcia, & Cohen, 2013). This is a 
promising mechanism for further exploration.  
The current findings join a growing body of literature showing that paranoia is 
common in the general population (e.g. Ellett et al, 2003; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; 
Freeman, 2007).  It is therefore important to consider why paranoia might be so common?  
Ellett et al. (2003) proposed that paranoia is a trait that was selected and distributed in 
humans due to its adaptive value under past environmental conditions.  Paranoia is a 
promising trait to consider from an evolutionary perspective. It is first and foremost a 
perception of interpersonal threat to self and has clear ecological importance (Sedikides & 
Showronski, 1997).  We therefore suggest that paranoia evolved to solve a specific problem 
(i.e. interpersonal safety) posed by ancestral selection pressures. The evolutionary maxim, 
better safe than sorry, might further elucidate the notorious resistance to change of clinical 
paranoia – that is, perception of threat once activated is slow to perseverate (Ellett & 
Chadwick, 2007). The present findings can thus be interpreted from an evolutionary 
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perspective—that is, paranoia has been selected by having past adaptive value at times when 
one is experiencing both high public self-awareness (i.e. feels oneself to be the object of 
others’ attention) and failure in one’s interactions with the environment—a form of 
vulnerability.  
An important methodological consideration in any experimental study that seeks to 
assess change over time is the use of repeat testing of key variables, which can affect the 
validity of participant responses.  Linked to this is the issue of measurement reactivity (Cook 
& Campbell, 1979), in which the act of being asked about certain thoughts, feelings and 
behaviours has an effect on their subsequent occurrence.   Repeat testing of key variables was 
a necessary component of the present design, as a way of addressing limitations in previous 
studies (i.e. Ellett & Chadwick, 2007), by enabling the assessment of change within 
participants over time, and ensuring equivalence at baseline between groups.  The following 
points are also relevant.  First, use of randomisation reduced the potential for variability 
across participants, and thus increased internal validity.  Second, our data converge with 
existing empirical and conceptual work (e.g. Ellett & Chadwick, 2007; Fenigstein & Vanable, 
1992; Steele, 1988), lending support to the generalizability of our findings. 
There are important ways in which the findings and linked model can be developed 
through future research. It will be important to extend these findings to real-world settings, 
for example through the use of experience sampling methodology, to determine whether 
feelings of suspicion and mistrust experienced in everyday situations can be modified by self-
affirmation processes.  Future research could also investigate the effects of self-affirmation 
procedures following a higher dose of exposure to threat, such as repeated failure under 
conditions of high self-awareness (see Ellett & Chadwick, 2007), and determine the 
durability of self-affirmation effects over time (e.g. Cohen et al., 2009; Harris & Napier, 
2005).  Future research might also usefully determine the applicability of self-affirmation in 
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the attenuation of clinical paranoia, perhaps especially in relation to Poor Me and Bad Me 
Paranoia (Trower & Chadwick, 1995), in which issues of self take centre stage. 
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Table 1: Means (standard deviations) for demographics and study measures, split by 
condition. 
 
Study Variable Affirmation Group 
Mean (SD) 
Control group 
Mean (SD) 
Comparison 
Statistics 
    
Age 22.71 (7.82) 21.96 (5.72) t(54) =.41, p = .69 
Gender (% female) 82%  68% χ2(1)=1.74, p=.19 
Baseline Depression 7.15 (7.31) 6.18 (6.16) t(54) =.52, p = .60 
State paranoia T1 12.75 (3.62) 13.74 (3.82) t(54) = .10, p = .34 
State paranoia T2 11.82 (2.67)              14.07 (3.80)             t(54) = 2.55, p = .01 
State paranoia T3 13.07 (3.88)        15.48 (4.13)        t(54) = 2.24, p = .03 
State depression T3 20.5 (8.82) 19.0 (6.68) t (54) = .76, p = .45 
 
Values task manipulation check 
   
This value has influenced 
my life 
5.72 (.54) 3.60 (1.08) t(53) = 8.77, p < .001 
I try to live up to this value 5.40 (.70) 3.16 (1.06) t(53) = 8.75, p < .001 
This value is an important 
part of who I am 
5.52 (.77) 3.72 (1.27) t(53) = 6.04, p < .001 
I care about this value 5.76 (.59) 3.60 (1.15) t(53) = 8.31, p < .001 
 
 
